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ABSTRACT
Coffee is a major contributor to the economies of East African Community (EAC) members. However,  recently,
export of the crop has declined due to internal and external forces of supply and demand. This paper sheds light
on the EAC’s comparative advantage in this cash crop in the international coffee market, with a special focus on
Burundi, whose green coffee export is a backbone to its total exports (75%). The study is based on the proposition
of the trade theory that partnership in international trade is determined by the prevailing comparative advantage.
An improved normalised comparative advantage index, Normalised Revealed Comparative Advantage (NRCA),
was used on data of coffee exports of  Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 3 4-grade, for the period
2000-2012. In order to conduct a dynamic comparative analysis, we used a time trend regression model to detect
whether a country has gained or lost its comparative advantage during the period under study. Instability analysis
was also used to depict the extent of NRCA volatility when the time trend was not statistical significant.
Empirical results reveal that EAC countries had comparative advantage, with Uganda and Kenya leading the
group during the period under study. However, they exhibited a simultaneous reduction in competitiveness in the
global market, though at different levels.  For the ECA countries to remain competitive in the global market, they
must strengthen their position in the market by tackling coffee price volatility at ^producer level and show
willingness to revamp the coffee industry.
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RÉSUMÉ
Le café est un grand support de l’économie des pays membre de la Communauté d’Afrique de l’Est (CAE).
Cependant, dans les périodes récentes, les exportations de cette culture industrielle a chuté a cause des facteurs
tant internes qu’externes de l’offre et de la demande. Cet article a pour but de dégager le niveau de l’avantage
comparatif des exportations de cette culture industrielle dans les pays importateurs, avec un aperçu spécial sur
le cas du Burundi dont les exportations dépendent  principalement du café (75 percent). Cette étude se base sur
l’hypothèse de la théorie de l’économie internationale selon laquelle les tendances du commerce international sont
prédites par l’avantage comparatif. L’indicateur de l’analyse de l’avantage comparatif, Avantage Comparatif
Révélé Normalisé (NRCA) a servi à analyser  NRCA sur les données des exportations du café vert, SITC grade
3- 4,  durant la période de 2000-2012. Pour mener une analyse comparative dynamique, nous avons utilisé le
modèle  de régression de tendance temporelle. Cette analyse  nous a permis  de savoir si le pays en question a
gagné ou perdu son avantage comparatif durant la période considérée.  L’analyse d’instabilité a été adoptée afin
de trouver le dégrée de la volatilité de NRCA lorsque la régression de tendance temporelle donnait  des résultats
dont les  différences étaient  statistiquement non significatives. Les résultats empiriques ont montre que tous les
pays membres de la CAE présentent un certain avantage comparatif dans ce secteur café avec le Kenya et
l’Uganda à la tête du groupe des pays pendant la période considérée. Néanmoins, tous ont perdu leur avantage
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comparatif dans le marché mondial du café durant la période en étude mais à  des niveaux relativement différents.
Cet article a recommande que si les pays de la CAE et spécifiquement le Burundi, veulent être compétitif sur  le
marché mondial du café, ils doivent résoudre l’épineux problème de la volatilite du prix au producteur, mais aussi
avoir la ferme volonté d’accélérer les politiques de restructuration du secteur café.
Mot Clés:   East African Community, Kenya, Uganda
INTRODUCTION
The export sector of most eastern and central
African countries is dominated by coffee, which
accounts for over 70 percent of foreign exchange
earnings from total exports (USAID, 2010).
However, coffee output and quality in the sub-
region have declined due to internal and external
factors (World Bank, 2011). More recently, it was
noted that coffee production decreased by 45
percent in 2011 compared to that in 2010 in
Burundi alone  (USAID, 2012). This was due to
the decline in coffee prices, that triggered poor
coffee husbandry practices and crop over-
maturity.
In 2006, market liberalisation in the sector
eroded the monopoly of public agencies by
allowing private enterprises to compete with it
and also brought changes in the regulatory
framework of  coffee trade. In the global market,
Burundi failed to adjust itself to the radical
changes such as the collapse of International
Coffee Agreement (ICA) quota system in 1989,
repositioning of the leading producer (Brazil),
technological innovation in coffee roasting and
blending, and the entry of new players in the
coffee market (Vietnam and China).
Despite these backdrops, Burundi has
conducive agro-ecological condition to produce
high-quality coffee and the coffee sub-sector is
in the process of being revived through a
comprehensive reform so that it may improve its
performance in the world market. The reforms
introduced in 1980 in Burundi that aimed at
boosting the coffee sector did not yield the
expected results. Another round of reforms
introduced in 1990s shaped the organisation and
management in the sector. The key reforms were
the privation of the sector and the downsizing of
the Office des Cultures Industrielles du Burundi
(OCIBU), a public agency playing production and
marketing roles, to a marketing board. External
players were called in to boost the quality of
coffee along the production value chain, and at
the same time promote the price incentive to
producers.
After joining the East African Community in
2007, the country needs to learn from its
neighbours and at the same time seize the unique
occasion to exploit the EAC Custom Union and
EAC Common Market protocols put in place. The
Customs Union is premised on easy access to
markets, reduction of trade barriers and access
to the major ports of the region, that is, Mombasa
and Dar Es Salam. Comparatively, Rwanda with a
highly concentrated coffee export like Burundi,
has reaped a lot from coffee privatisation and
coffee production efficiency introduced since
2001. Tanzania and Uganda are on the same
agenda with regard to the speed and magnitude
of coffee production and marketing reforms
implementation  in 1990s. Despite coffee sub-
sector liberalisation, the Coffee Board of Kenya
(CBK) remains the main player in regulation and
marketing of coffee in the EAC (Nyangito, 2001).
This paper presents the level of comparative
advantage of Burundi coffee in relation to the
EAC countries considered as benchmarks. The
paper also attempts to show the coffee
comparative advantage score trend of the
country; with focus on the status of Burundi
coffee export.
Theory of comparative advantage.  While several
articles on the comparative advantage approach
in recent years seem to rely on the Balassa
(1965)’s framework, much less effort has been
devoted to use the advanced tool of comparative
advantage to correct the shortcomings of Balassa
Revealed Comparative Advantage (BRCA) in Sub-
Sahara Africa studies (Ndimanya and
Ndayitwayeko, 2009; Makochekanwa, 2007;
Shinyekwa and Othieno, 2011; World Bank, 2011,
Mzumara et al., 2013; Chingarande et al. 2013).
According to Bebek (2011), the major weakness
of BRCA index is that it violates four statistical
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properties of a true comparative advantage index,
such as symmetry of the index and its
demarcation, fixed effective bounds, mean
stationarity and uniqueness of the index value.
The proponents of comparative advantage index
examined how the distribution of their indices
differs from the original index (BRCA), and at the
same time achieved the four mentioned statistical
properties. NRCA index by Run et al. (2009) was
born out of the desire of finding a reliable and
effective index to explain both dynamic and cross-
country reveal comparative advantage.
The dynamic trend of comparative advantage
used to explain the Sub-Saharan Africa’s coffee
competitiveness has not received adequate
attention and is addressed in this paper. Besides,
this paper uses the novel tool known as
Normalised Revealed Comparative Advantage
(NRCA) by Run et al. (2009) in order to
circumvent the limitations of BRCA and better
understand the dynamics of the level of
competitiveness in the coffee sector of EAC. To
the best of our knowledge, no time series estimate
on RCA exist for Burundi and EAC member states
in general.
Profiles of the coffee export sub-sectors in the
EAC member countries.  Rwanda Government
policy since 1994 moved towards the liberalisation
and privatisation of the coffee industry. Various
constraints, such as export tax, were removed so
that Rwandan exporters were able to pay fully
competitive prices to producers. The
establishment of Rwanda Competition Board, the
increase of coffee-washing stations and the
improvement of coffee quality or specialty coffee,
re-positioned the Rwanda coffee sector in the
world market. The growth of coffee production
and exports was attributed to this government
policy reform that had a direct bearing on the
establishment by competitive private firms and
individuals of modernised coffee washing
stations and huge investment in primary
processing in the coffee sector.
In Uganda, according to Bussolo et al. (2006),
the Uganda Coffee Authority Board embraced
strategies aimed at improving the level of
competitiveness of their coffee (second largest
producer in Africa after Ethiopia), in the
international market by disseminating new coffee
varieties, promoting domestic coffee
consumption through training in coffee roasting,
brand development, market research and
encouraging value addition and penetration in
new and emerging coffee markets.
In Tanzania, the sale of coffee was regulated
and controlled by the Tanzania Coffee Board
(TCB) through two channels, namely the Moshi
Coffee Auction  and direct export only for quality
coffee permitted by licenses issued by TCB
(Mhando et al., 2013). A strongly regulated coffee
sector may put Tanzania at competitive
disadvantage in the region as well as in the world.
To the contrary, in Burundi, coffee production is
in the hands of competitive private firms and
individuals and this has somewhat reduced the
occurrence of distorted coffee prices.
The Kenyan Government reduced the powers
of Kenya Planters Cooperative Union in 1999
through a special legislative supplement of the
Coffee Act Chapter 333, which was the main
exporter of coffee in the country, by licensing
nine new processing firms and millers. Like in
Tanzania, coffee sale in Kenya was done in two
ways, namely by sale directly and at the digital
Nairobi Coffee Auction. However, growers
continued to receive unattractive prices because
of highly costly and poor service delivery done
by cooperative or private enterprises (Nyangito,
2001).
East African Community coffee exports for 1980-
2011.  The coffee export patterns from 1980 to
2011 exhibit four features (Fig.  1). Firstly, a rise
in exports registered during 1986 and 1995
resulting from the severe frost and damage to the
coffee crop of the leading exporter, Brazil, the
coffee shortage of which pushed the Arabica
coffee price up.
This led to high volumes of coffee exports
from Brasil’s coffee export competitors, EAC
countries being among them (Otim and
Ngategize, 1993; Nestlé, 2004).  Secondly, the EAC
exports progressively declined up to the lowest
point around 1992-1994 (Fig. 1).  Again, a general
fall in export was recorded in 2002;  followed by a
modest growth up to date. Figure 1 depicts two
coffee export leaders in EAC, which are, Kenya
and Uganda but with a quasi dominance of
Uganda since 1995.  Burundi and Rwanda were
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the least coffee exporters in EAC because of
limited factor endowment (land) and technology,
though coffee was grown in a conducive
environment and volcanic soils.
While Burundi’s coffee export was greater
than that of Rwanda since 1980, their  export
trends intertwined from 2003 onwards. The
implementation of Rwanda’s coffee reforms and
success attracted Foreign Development
Investment (FDI) which boosted its export.
Normalised revealed comparative advantage of
EAC countries trend (1980-2011).  On overall,
the five EAC countries lost their comparative
advantage in 1986, the year of great performance
in the world coffee trade. The NRCA decline in
trends which started 1996/1997 went even further
below 0.25 because of the decline in the world
coffee price which reached its trough in 2001 (Fig.
2).
Bussolo et al. (2006) assessed the impact of
declining coffee price on coffee production by
analysing the trend of world coffee price and its
implications on the level of coffee growers’
poverty in Uganda. The EAC countries have been
facing stiff competition and losing market share
to the new producers such as the Philippines and
other Asian countries. Their contribution to the
world market became dismal because coffee price
plummeted in the global market. Nevertheless,
Uganda kept pace with Kenya and both had a
NRCA score above 1.0 during 1980-1987 prior to
the ‘lost decade’ (1990-2000) due to the Structural
Adjustment Programme. The drivers of their
competitiveness outfit are explained by being able
to contain supply chain factors, hindering
production performance and also streamlining
efforts to capture niche markets in developed and
developing coffee consuming countries
(Fairtrade, 2012; Mmri, 2012).
Burundi registered a progressive fall in its
comparative advantage from a NRCA score of
0.41 in 1980-1987 to a score of 0.03 in 2004-2011,
that is a 93 percent decline in comparative
advantage (Table 2). However, there was an
overall appreciation of the coffee competitiveness
when EAC as a whole traded this commodity with
the rest of the world.
The findings reported in Table 2  contradict
those of Chingarande et al. (2013) that unroasted

















Figure 1.    East African Community country coffee exports during 1980-2010.
EAC country exports

















TABLE 1.    Burundi coffee census data (2000-2010)
Year       Yielda                  Productiona                      Exporta                      Farmerb price        Worlda price          Farmer
                               (t ha-1)               (mt)           (US$)    (US$ kg-1)            (US$ kg-1)      earning (%)
2000 0.88 18500 30941 0.81 1.54 0.52
2001 0.88 15834 21109 0.68 1 0.68
2002 0.90 36000 18032 0.69 0.93 0.74
2003 0.91 20100 25169 0.59 1.09 0.54
2004 0.90 36000 18124 0.63 1.28 0.49
2005 0.87 7800 47056 1.07 1.75 0.61
2006 0.97 31000 38073 1.9 1.93 0.98
2007 1 29946 46895 1.76 2.21 0.8
2008 0.91 7305 39419 1.92 2.62 0.73
2009 0.97 25130 39476 1.90 2.28 0.83
2010 0.95 6821 69845 1.86 2.72 0.68
Source:   aFAOSTAT, 10 September 2013, bInternational Coffee Organisation.   (ICO), 10 September 2013
Figure 2.    Normalised Revealed Comparative Advantage of EAC countries Trend (1980-2011).
coffee emerged among the ten top product with a
high BRCA. However, the BRCA as an analytical
tool has shortcomings described above (static
and not comparable over time). Compared to its
counterparts, it  ranks second last, but due to the
success of Rwanda’s coffee sector during this
decade (2003-2013), Burundi NRCA trend
followed that of Rwanda despite the privatisation
reforms introduced previously in Burundi to kick-
start the revival of the sector.
The results of the time trend model revealed
that EAC countries exhibited a comparative
disadvantage (Table 3).  The variable time trend
was negative (less than zero) and very
statistically significant, implying that the EAC
countries’ coffee export competitiveness was
EAC country NRCA scores
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TABLE 2.     Normalised revealed comparative advantage summary results (1980-2011)
EAC Country   1980-1987   1988-1995        1996-2003             2004-2011
Burundi 0.41 0.20 0.06 0.03
Kenya 1.41 0.58 0.29 0.12
Rwanda 0.35 0.14 0.02 0.03
Tanzania 0.69 0.27 0.15 0.07
Uganda 1.67 0.53 0.35 0.19
EAC 0.18 0.60 0.14 0.30
unstable, volatile and declining during the period
under study. Kenya and Uganda’s slopes were
not as steep as those of their neighbours.
Rwanda possessed the highest instability
index of 77%, followed by Burundi at 57%. This
could be attributed to the recent structural and
institutional reforms that shook the whole  coffee
production and trade system in the two countries,
and spurred competitiveness in the last decade
2000-2010.  However, the instability in
competitiveness could also mean the degree of
exposure to world shocks, specifically the price
volatility due to either coffee overproduction or
the existence of price asymmetry in the
transmission of price changes.
Burundian coffee export sub-sector.    Introduced
in 1930s, the coffee industry in Burundi has
undergone several re-organisations and major
reforms. Burundi grows two types of coffee,
Coffea arabica and Coffea robusta. Coffea
arabica is concentrated in the northern and
central parts of Burundi (Ngozi, Kayanza, Gitega
and Kirundo); while the coffee robusta is largely
in the northern-east region (Bubanza and
Cibitoke). On the other hand, the Coffea arabica
‘Bourbon variety’ represents 96 percent and the
varieties constituting coffee robusta in the
country.
Coffee is grown predominantly as a
smallholder cash crop; providing incomes for
600,000 households and occupying
approximately 70,000 hectares, carrying about  25
millions of trees (PAGE, 2007; USAID, 2010). With
the introduction of micro-credit scheme,
ownership of coffee tree plantation is the means
by which the smallholder farmers used as a
collateral, asset presented to micro-credit
institution such as Saving and Credit Cooperative
(COOPEC) and others (USAID, 2010).
Despite efforts engaged by the State to
revamp the coffee sector, the latter was not spared
by the vagaries of shortage of coffee supply due
to the domestic meager production, world coffee
volatility and financial crisis. The shortage of
coffee supply to the world market was due to
TABLE 3.    East African Country coffee trend regression and instability index estimation (1980-2011)
Estimate               Burundi            Kenya           Rwanda       Tanzania       Uganda
Constant 0.42* 1.43* 0.35* 0.69* 1.61*
Coefficient -0.01* -0.05* -0.01* -0.02* -0.06*
SE Coeff. 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007
t-stat Coeff. -7.81 -9.24 -6.21 -10.07 -8.37
F-stat 60.95* 85.45* 38.55* 101.33* 70.11*
R2
adj
0.66 0.73 0.55 0.76 0.69
C V 0.97 0.91 1.14 0.87 0.92
Instability Index 0.57 0.48 0.77 0.43 0.51
 *  =  significance at 1% level, SE = standard error, CV = Coefficient of variation
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endogenous factors such as demographic
pressure and land scarcity. Indeed, coffee is
grown in the most populated regions in Burundi,
that is, Ngozi, Gitega and Kayanza. The coffee
price volatility in the world market has impeded
the acceleration of coffee reforms.  Burundi coffee
farmers are viewed as the most poorly
remunerated in the EAC region and sometimes
below the cost of production (Table 1).
In  the 1990’s, Arabica coffee producers of
Uganda received 76% higher price than that
received by their Burundian counterparts
(USAID, 2010). The fact that a low price is given
to coffee producers when it is known that there
is a boom in the consuming countries is what
economists refer  to as the ‘coffee paradox’. This
was explained by price asymmetries in the coffee
trade, oversupply and time lag in reconstruction
of world market (Kang and Kennedy, 2009).
However, in the case of Burundi, the reasons
given for the low prices at producer level were
associated with primarily the scrupulous coffee
export agents (collusion of international traders),
decade of socio-political unrest within the
country and state control. Low incomes generated
from coffee plantation has led to either uprooting
of coffee trees or intercropping with food crops.
Lack of effective agricultural extension service
as well as illequipped and under funded research
stations have been major supply-side constraints.
According to USAID (2010), OCIBU with four
technical officers, lacks enough human resources
to equip coffee farmers with new technologies
and deliver educational programmes on good
husbandry practice. This tendency has led to poor
coffee production and has forced policy makers
to intervene in order to seek avenues for
promoting coffee productivity. This was in
contrast with the expansion of coffee hectarage
in 1990s with the aim of increasing coffee
production (USAID, 2007).
The policy prevailing prior to coffee
liberalisation of 1980s, was that of ‘stick and
carrot; subsidising coffee production in terms of
maintaining floor producer prices in order to
stimulate production (World Bank, 2011) and at
the same time, forbid farmers to uproot coffee
trees. But given the trend of world coffee
development and the implementation of Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Burundi
dropped such a policy and embraced the
privatisation of the sector. This was done in three
phases, namely the privatisation of management
which saw the creation of private operator, the
Mixed Public-private Company with Curing
(SODECO) and SOGESTAL managing the de-
pulping and washing stations.
The second phase was the introduction of
deregulation measures with the attempt to limit
State intervention in the sector. The re-structuring
of the sector was the last attempt aimed at
revamping it creating room for investment of the
private companies in the sector.
The coffee exports fell in the hands of the
private companies and Burundi Coffee Company
(BCC), a State-own company.  In order to
strengthen their negotiation power, all private
companies were regrouped in a professional
association called Association of Burundi Coffee
Exporters (ABEC). Coffee was sold either at
auction by these companies or directly to buyers,
thereby bypassing the coffee board.
Albeit all these reforms, coffee growers were
sidelined and continued to receive meager
revenue from their coffee. Besides, the State still
had its grip on the sub-sector and there was a
strong need for establishing a non-partisan coffee
agency to fully regulate the coffee industry. The
agency should be preferably an independent
body answerable to the minister of agriculture,
and enforce the laws for delivering services such
as coffee processing and marketing.
With the liberalisation of the Burundi coffee
industry, coffee farmers engaged with
international coffee buyers for only specialty
coffee, but through the facilitation of the trade
regulatory body named Coffee Chain Regulatory
Authority of Burundi (ARFIC). The gateways of
Burundi green coffee were the sea ports of
Mombasa in Kenya and Dar-Es-Salam in
Tanzania.  The dominant destinations were
European countries, with Germany topping the
list, and North American countries such as USA
and Canada.
As Rwanda and Tanzania successfully
reformed their coffee sector by being aggressive
in coffee specialty production and adopting
highly advanced marketing strategies in the
world market, Burundi still lagged behind because
of wrangles in the privatisation process and the
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slow pace in the enforcement of decisions
regarding the deregulation and privatisation of
the coffee industry (USAID, 2010).
Trade policy has been designed in such a
way that the export sub-sector, coffee sub-sector
in particular, is promoted. The export tariff on
coffee beans was abolished in Burundi by 2005
(USAID, 2007). The imports of unprocessed
coffee, other than beans, attract an average tariff
of 25 percent, compared with 100 per cent in 2003.
The liberal coffee trade system was formed in
order to allow a full participation of the coffee
growers, who were organised in an association
called the National Confederation of Coffee
Growers (CNAC). The withdrawal of the State
from coffee business enabled the growers to
retain 72 per cent of the profits of 2010/2011 coffee
season, ARFIC 1.68 per cent, INTERCAFE 3.5
per cent, SODECO 4.9 per cent, SOGESTAL 16.32
per cent, coffee promotion 0.4 per cent and state
service only 1.2 per cent (World Bank, 2011).
Besides, the existence of many players in this
sub-sector ignited a stiff competition and the
improvement of the coffee quality in Burundi.
In EAC, the coffee sub-sector followed the
same pattern of liberalisation. In Rwanda, a
national coffee strategy was drawn, with clear
targets and with a sole aim of increasing the
income of small scale coffee growers through
scaling up their participation along the coffee
value chain (Mutandwa et al., 2009). The latter
sold their coffee cherries to coffee-washing
stations owned either by cooperative or private
enterprises.
CONCLUSION
Burundi is the least competitive amongst all EAC
members despite the liberalisation of the coffee
sector. The declining of comparative advantage
may explain the status of coffee sector of Burundi
in which a large part of its production is exported
to the world market. The low price paid to the
producers and the asymmetries in the coffee
value chain are sources of poor production and
quality of  Burundi’s coffee.  The failure to fully
privatise the semi-washed, fully-washed stations
and SOGESTALs has led to an unequal
distribution of coffee revenues among the coffee
stakeholders.  Privatisation of these processing
sectors is considered as the crucial determinant
of coffee reforms and driver of Burundi’s coffee
comparative advantage in the EAC region.
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